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Abstract 
A salient and under-researched aspect of un/fair treatment in organizations can be the source of 
justice, in terms of a specific justice agent. We propose a model of agent bias to describe how 
and when characteristics of the agent enacting justice are important to justice reasoning. The 
agent bias is defined as the effect on overall event justice perceptions of specific agent 
characteristics, over and above the effect via distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. 
For justice recipients to focus on agent characteristics rather than on the event being evaluated 
in terms of fairness is an unexplored bias in justice judgments. Agent warmth, competence, and 
past justice track record (entity justice) are identified as agent characteristics that influence 
justice judgments. Agent characteristics can influence overall event justice perceptions 
positively or negatively, depending on the ambiguity in terms of justice of the event and on its 
expectedness from a particular justice agent. Finally, we propose that agent bias is stronger 
when justice recipients use intuitive versus analytic information processing of event 
information. Our model of agent bias has important theoretical implications for theories of 
organizational justice and for other literatures, as well as important practical implications for 
organizations and managers. 
2 
 
 Organizational justice research has proceeded at a remarkable pace for over four 
decades, emerging as a dominant theory for explaining employee work behaviors in response 
to workplace events – and in particular to negative events. To the extent that employees feel 
fairly treated they are more likely to accept change (e.g., Rodell & Colquitt, 2009), express 
commitment toward their organization, and engage in citizenship behaviors (e.g., Colquitt, 
Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). In contrast, when employees feel unfairly treated they 
are more likely to reduce effort on tasks, engage in counterproductive behaviors, and leave the 
organization (e.g. Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001).  
There is broad agreement among scholars that organizational justice is comprised of 
four facets: outcomes, procedures, explanations for decisions, and interpersonal treatment 
(Colquitt, 2001). With some exceptions (e.g., Bies, 2001; Roch & Shannock, 2006), it has been 
assumed that in order to arrive at fairness judgments, individuals systematically process 
information relating to these four facets. Most research in organizational justice has assumed 
that employees have the information, time, and attention to systematically evaluate events. 
However, there may be occasions when employees base their fairness judgments on criteria that 
are less effortful and more quickly processed. We argue in this paper that a salient and under-
researched aspect of un/fair treatment can be the source of justice, in terms of a specific justice 
agent. 
 We define agent bias as the direct effect of agent characteristics on overall justice 
judgments regarding an event, over and above other possible effects on evaluations of 
distributive, procedural, informational, or interpersonal justice. We build on the justice (e.g., 
Folger & Cropanzano, 2001; Marques, Patient, & Cojuharenco, 2017), trust (e.g., Holtz, 2013), 
social cognition (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006), and judgment and decision making (e.g., 
Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2014) literatures to reason when agent characteristics are likely to 
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have a direct effect on overall justice, over and above dimensional justice (Figure 1).  
Given the salience of the agent(s) administering justice, our models of justice reasoning 
are enriched by better understanding when and how agent characteristics can influence justice 
perceptions. From a managerial perspective, this research can help identify situations in which 
organizations should take care to demonstrate in detail the fairness of decisions, in order to 
avoid quick and intuitive responses to specific decision makers.  
We first review research on determinants of justice judgments and on the role of agents 
in the justice literature. Next, we define the agent bias, and discuss the effects on the agent bias 
of relevant past experience with the justice agent, the ambiguity of an event and its expectedness 
for a particular agent, and the information processing style used to evaluate an event. We 
conclude by reviewing theoretical and managerial implications and proposing avenues for 
future research.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Determinants of Justice Judgments 
Major Theories 
We situate our theorizing about agent bias in the context of fairness theory (Folger & 
Cropanzano, 2001) and fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001). 
Fairness theory. According to fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), 
individuals perceive injustice when what they experience can be unfavorably compared to an 
alternative that would have been better, that could have been the case, and that, according to 
universal rules, should have been. Research shows that the ease with which individuals can 
generate such upward counterfactuals relates negatively to the evaluation of actual events 
(Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995) or, in this case, to greater perceptions of injustice. In 
contrast, the ease with which individuals can generate downward counterfactuals, whereby 
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comparisons are made to less favourable alternatives, relates positively to the evaluation of 
actual events (Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995). Nicklin, Greenbaum, McNall, Folger, and 
Williams (2011) have used insights from the literature on counterfactual thinking to explain 
effects of contextual variables on fairness reasoning. Specifically they have shown that outcome 
severity, knowledge and expertise of the justice agent, and type of conduct affect fairness 
reasoning by facilitating or hindering counterfactual thinking. For example, they found that 
mistakes made by more knowledgeable agents are perceived as more unfair than mistakes made 
by less knowledgeable agents, due to the greater ease with which upward counterfactuals were 
generated in the former case.  
Fairness heuristic theory. Fairness heuristic theory (FHT; Lind, 2001) suggests that 
individuals use cognitive shortcuts to assess fairness in order to decide whether to cooperate in 
social exchange relationships. According to FHT, fairness can serve as a proxy for trust in a 
justice agent, when there has been insufficient time and experience for the trustworthiness of 
an authority to be established. Because fairness judgments need to be made very quickly, they 
will often result from a disproportionate emphasis placed on the initial information received, 
the primacy effect in justice reasoning (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 2001). When information on 
some aspects of the event (for example, outcomes) is lacking, individuals use other available 
information to “fill in the blanks”, the so-called substitutability effect (Lind, 2001). For 
example, the fairness of procedures used in deciding an outcome may be relied upon to 
determine the fairness of an outcome, when clear information regarding the latter is not 
available (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Qin, Ren, Zhang and Johnson (2015) have shown that any of 
the event justice dimensions (distributive, procedural or, interactional) can be used as a 
substitute for other dimensions for which fairness information is less clear. Such substitutability 
effects are stronger for individuals who are less comfortable with uncertainty.  
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Fairness theory and fairness heuristic theory regard justice as “in the eye of the 
beholder”, and therefore a subjective judgment prone to idiosyncrasies and biases. Whereas the 
early literature on organizational justice focused more on justice effects (e.g., Colquitt et al., 
2001) rather than justice formation, our agent bias theorizing builds on the more recent focus 
on justice judgment formation (e.g., Brockner, Wiesenfeld, Siegel, Bobocel, & Liu, 2015) in 
order to connect to insights from literatures such as trust, social cognition, and judgment and 
decision making. 
The Role of Agents  
Early theories of organizational justice focused on the fairness of outcomes (e.g., 
Adams, 1965). The field then focused on the procedures used in outcome allocations, initially 
in legal settings (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). It may be that in such settings, there was little 
concern about the justice agent because the agent (judge) was appointed to the role and assumed 
to be appropriately qualified and impartial. Yet, subsequent literature on justice effects and 
justice formation has touched upon the importance of agents. 
The role of agents in justice effects. Selecting appropriate justice agents was regarded 
by Leventhal (1980) as an important structural element preceding any allocative process. In Foa 
and Foa (1980), the agent was also identified as an important aspect of resource allocations, 
especially for resources that are more symbolic versus material (e.g., love, respect, status) and 
more particular versus universal (e.g., affection), meaning that their value depended in part on 
whom they were received from.  
Several recent models in organizational justice have proposed differences in reactions 
to unfair treatment depending on the source. The agent-system model (Tyler & Bies, 1990) 
argues that since interactional justice stems from the supervisor (the agent) and procedural 
justice from the organization (the system), interactional justice perceptions should relate more 
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strongly to supervisor-targeted reactions and procedural justice perceptions should relate more 
strongly to system-targeted reactions. Although the model has received some empirical support 
(Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000), other evidence has shown that interactional 
justice can affect both organization and supervisor-targeted reactions (Moorman, 1991; Rupp 
& Cropanzano, 2002). Accordingly, the agent-dominance model (Jones, Fassina, & Uggerslev, 
2006) argues that justice judgments are rooted in interactions with specific agents, and therefore 
interactional justice will affect reactions towards both the supervisor and the organization, and 
more strongly than other justice dimensions. Finally, Lavelle, Rupp, and Brockner (2007) 
propose the target similarity model as a multifoci perspective in which employees can evaluate 
and react to any source in terms of distributive, procedural and interactional justice. In their 
meta-analysis, Rupp, Shao, Jones, and Liao (2014) showed that multifoci justice perceptions 
more strongly predicted outcomes directed at matched sources than did dimensional justice 
perceptions. This shows that identifying the justice source can more strongly predict reactions 
to injustice than the dimension of justice that is violated. 
The agent-system, agent-dominance and target similarity models all suggest that 
employees distinguish between sources of justice and target their justice reactions accordingly. 
However, the role of agent characteristics in justice judgment formation and the question of 
why equivalent events may be evaluated differently depending on the specific source remain 
unanswered. 
The role of agents in justice formation. Researchers have turned to agent 
characteristics as a possible influence on overall event justice, as they noted significant 
unexplained variance in overall justice judgments after controlling for dimensional justice 
(Ambrose & Schminke, 2009; Holtz & Harold, 2009). For instance, Rodell, Colquitt, and Baer 
(2012) identified supervisor humor, physical attractiveness and similarity to employee as 
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characteristics that helped explain a portion of unexplained variance in overall event justice 
judgments.  
Holtz (2013, 2015) used agent trustworthiness as an organizing framework to study the 
effect of agent characteristics on event justice judgments. In his trust primacy model, Holtz 
(2013) argues that one can very quickly evaluate, possibly without conscious deliberation, agent 
trustworthiness (e.g. Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009). This is consistent with social 
cognition research on first impressions, as the dimensions of trustworthiness – integrity, 
benevolence, and competence (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) – overlap with the two 
universal dimensions of first impressions: warmth and competence (integrity and benevolence 
are commonly subsumed under warmth characteristics). Holtz (2013) predicts positive effects 
of agent trustworthiness on event justice judgments, with the strength of these effects depending 
on how confident are the beliefs in the agent’s trustworthiness. When individuals are more 
ambiguous about someone’s trustworthiness, the effects of trustworthiness are smaller than 
when they are more certain.  
The Agent Bias 
In this section, we define the agent bias in detail, and introduce factors influencing its 
form, direction, and magnitude.  
A cognitive bias refers to a systematic deviation from rationality in judgments, whereby 
inferences about people or situations are made in an inconsistent or illogical fashion (Haselton, 
Nettle & Andrews, 2005). The agent bias is defined as the effect of agent characteristics on the 
overall justice of an event, which is not mediated by the event’s distributive, procedural, or 
interactional justice, or by other action- or outcome-based criteria. That is, agent bias is an 
umbrella term for all determinants of overall justice judgments relating directly to 
characteristics of the agent rather than to actions taken by the agent or outcomes experienced 
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by the recipient. We refer to this phenomenon as a bias because evaluations regarding the agent 
may not be relevant to the fairness of an event if the event is evaluated by standard justice 
criteria. As a result of the agent bias, similar actions and outcomes can be evaluated differently 
depending on agent characteristics. Figure 2 depicts the agent bias in overall event justice 
judgments. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Cognitive biases frequently result from the application of heuristics: mental shortcuts 
that save time and mental energy by sidestepping thorough processing of relevant information 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Evaluations regarding the agent happen with ease and 
automaticity, and are therefore likely to be used as a heuristic in evaluating fairness of a specific 
event. Like the fundamental attribution error (Jones & Nisbett, 1971), the agent bias results 
from a tendency in social situations to overly focus attention on the person and on 
characteristics of the person, rather than on circumstances and events external to the person. 
The agent bias, however, focuses on perceptions of event fairness, rather than on internal versus 
external attributions for events. 
In the next section, we discuss which agent characteristics are expected to influence 
judgments of overall event justice. Then we propose how the form, direction, and magnitude of 
the bias will depend on: 1) previous relevant experience between justice recipient and agent, 2) 
the ambiguity and expectedness to the recipient of the actions and outcomes of the justice agent, 
and 3) the information processing style used by the justice recipient when making fairness 
judgments.  
Form of the Bias: Agent Characteristics 
Individuals form justice judgments quickly in order to decide whether to cooperate with 
others, and thereby risk exploitation, in social situations (Lind, 2001). Hence, the first 
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information available will have a greater influence on justice judgments, a widely documented 
primacy effect in fairness reasoning (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 2001). Person perception is 
associated with spontaneous trait and evaluative inferences that are formed quickly often 
unconsciously (Schneid, Carlston, & Skowronski, 2015). The agent bias stems precisely from 
the ease and automaticity of person perception, whereby agent characteristics that are available 
and accessible can serve as proxies for details regarding event justice. We focus below on three 
classes of characteristics that may be especially relevant to justice judgments: perceived 
warmth, competence, and entity justice. Warmth and competence account for 82% of the 
variance in first impressions about a person (Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Entity 
justice is relevant because it is a summative impression regarding justice-relevant events 
attributed to a given individual (Rupp & Paddock, 2010).  
The trust primacy model (Holtz, 2013) discusses similar agent characteristics, but is 
focused on entity justice perceptions over time. According to the model, agent trustworthiness 
affects justice evaluations of events through trust, which, in turn, shape entity justice 
perceptions. Entity justice then affects subsequent evaluations of trustworthiness. For our 
purposes, we focus on a point in time when a given agent may be characterized by either entity 
justice or warmth and competence. We regard these different characteristics of the agent as 
complementary and possibly competing in affecting the evaluations of event justice. Agent 
warmth, competence, and entity justice are discussed below in greater detail. 
Warmth. Individuals are perceived to be warm when they demonstrate friendliness, 
helpfulness, trustworthiness, and morality (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2006). There are two ways 
in which the perceived warmth of a justice agent can influence justice judgments regarding 
specific events. First, characteristics relating to warmth – friendliness, helpfulness, 
trustworthiness, and morality – overlap with what may be expected of a fair agent. Therefore, 
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the warmth of an individual is likely to be associated with their tendency to provide sensitive 
treatment, keep promises, apply procedures consistently, and uphold standards of ethicality. For 
example, Hollensbe, Khazanchi and Masterson (2008) found that supervisor friendliness and 
support related positively to newcomer perceptions of fairness, and Colquitt and Rodell (2011) 
found a reciprocal relationship between employee perceptions of supervisor integrity and of 
supervisor fairness. Second, warmth judgments regarding an agent are used to gauge his or her 
intentions: warm individuals are regarded as more likely to take actions and pursue outcomes 
that benefit others (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2006). The behavior expected from warm 
individuals directly addresses fundamental justice motives: to receive favorable outcomes, to 
be included in groups as a respected member, and to see universal ethical rules followed 
(Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001).   
Competence. Individuals are perceived as competent when they demonstrate 
intelligence, skill, and efficiency (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2006). The competence of a justice 
agent can also influence interpretation of justice-related events because of positive expectations 
regarding the knowledge of competent individuals (Nicklin, et al., 2011). Competence is 
considered highly diagnostic of an agent’s ability to pursue and to achieve desired outcomes 
(Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2006). In fairness situations, competence can be seen as helping an 
agent make decisions that follow principles of equity and are consistent, based on accurate 
information, and recognize all relevant inputs. In settings where intentions are organizationally 
defined, the competence of an agent may be an especially important signal to employees that 
they will be treated fairly. For instance, Mossholder, Bennett, Kemery and Wesolowski (1998) 
found that the extent to which supervisor power derived from expertise was associated with 
higher employee perceptions of procedural justice. 
Entity justice. Entity justice is particularly relevant to overall justice judgments 
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regarding events because it is based on an agent’s past fairness (Cropanzano et al., 2001). 
Justice judgments regarding outcomes, procedures and interactions relating to specific events 
are aggregated over time to form entity justice perceptions regarding individuals (Cropanzano 
et al., 2001; Rupp & Paddock, 2010). These entity justice judgments are similar to event justice 
judgments in purpose and structure. Individuals are motivated to evaluate entity justice for the 
same reasons that they evaluate event justice: in order to understand whether an authority can 
be trusted and should be cooperated with. Like event justice judgments, entity justice judgments 
regarding specific agents are arrived at by evaluating distributive, procedural, and interactional 
dimensions. This justice “track record” of the agent has been shown to affect important attitudes 
and behaviors at work (e.g., Choi & Chen, 2004), be subject to revisions in light of specific 
fairness-related events (Jones & Skarlicki, 2013), and shape event justice perceptions (e.g., 
Davy, Kinicki & Scheck, 1991).  
Form of the Bias: The Role of Previous Relevant Experience with the Agent 
Individuals quickly form impressions of other people’s warmth and competence in order 
to anticipate and interpret their future behavior (Fiske, 2004). Entity justice perceptions serve a 
similar purpose, but specifically focus on the justice-related actions and outcomes associated 
with a person, and thus are likely to have greater diagnostic value in predicting event fairness. 
Information is more likely to be assimilated when it is highly relevant to the judgment at hand 
(Mussweiler & Strack, 2001) and when there is longer exposure to that information (Higgins & 
Brendl, 1995). Because entity justice judgments are similar to event justice judgments in 
purpose and structure and because entity justice is relatively stable over time, when available, 
it is expected to override first impressions based on warmth and competence of the agent. 
However, in the absence of a justice-relevant track record the agent bias is expected to manifest 
as a significant effect of warmth and competence-related characteristics of the agent.  
12 
 
Proposition 1: When there is no previous relevant experience between justice recipient 
and agent, overall event justice will be influenced by warmth and competence.  
Proposition 2: When there is previous relevant experience between justice recipient and 
agent, overall event justice will be influenced by the agent’s entity justice, and to a lesser 
extent by warmth and competence. 
Direction of the Bias: Positive versus Negative Relationships between Agent 
Characteristics and Overall Event Justice 
In this section, we argue that the manifestation of the agent bias is not limited to positive 
relationships between the agent warmth, competence, or entity justice and overall event justice. 
In fact, both positive and negative relationships are possible, depending on the ambiguity and 
expectedness of the event.  
We refer to events in which the actions of the agent and/or the resulting outcomes clearly 
uphold or clearly violate justice criteria as unambiguous (e.g., deciding to promote someone 
who works less hard). In contrast, events in which actions and outcomes are not clearly just or 
unjust are referred to as ambiguous. Event ambiguity can result from different justice criteria 
being in conflict across or within dimensions (e.g., an explanation of a promotion decision that 
is detailed but delayed), from a lack of information to assess justice criteria (e.g., a bonus is 
received but no information is available on bonuses received by others), or from the novelty of 
the situation (e.g., the value of a new award may be unclear). 
Event ambiguity differs in two respects from justice clarity (Qin et al., 2015): “the extent 
to which people have direct and relevant information to judge a particular type of justice” 
(p.750). First, event ambiguity applies to overall justice rather than to a specific justice 
dimension. Although event ambiguity may stem from the lack of clarity regarding specific 
justice dimensions, it can also result from conflicts between justice dimensions that are all high 
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on clarity. Second, whereas Qin and colleagues (2015) argue that judgments of event justice 
will be made using information from types of justice with high versus low clarity, we propose 
that agent characteristics can substitute for event information in cases of high event ambiguity.  
Agent characteristics are expected to relate positively to overall event justice in high 
ambiguity events. For example, if an event is highly ambiguous in terms of fairness, agent 
characteristics (warmth, competence, entity justice) are expected to positively influence 
perceptions of event overall justice. However, if an event is clear in terms of fairness, agent 
characteristics (warmth, competence, and entity justice) will be used as part of counterfactual 
comparisons regarding how the event would, could, and should have been different. 
We discuss the role of event ambiguity rather than, as in the case of the trust primacy 
model, ambiguity regarding agent characteristics (Holtz, 2013). As a result, we do not merely 
discuss the relative strength of the positive relationship between agent characteristics and event 
justice, but also the possibility of negative relationships between agent characteristics and event 
justice. Nicklin and colleagues (2011) showed that agent characteristics can affect justice 
judgments by prompting more upward counterfactual reasoning. In our analysis, we consider 
the possibility of generating both more favorable (upward) and less favorable (downward) 
counterfactuals.  
High event ambiguity. When a justice event is ambiguous, information regarding agent 
warmth, competence, and entity justice can be used to infer the intentions behind an ambiguous 
action or outcome. For example, a warm agent will be trusted to have favorable intentions, and 
a competent agent will be trusted to choose the best possible course of action (Cuddy, Glick, & 
Beninger, 2011). According to the trust primacy model, such trust will, in turn, lead to 
counterfactual thinking that preserves trust-related expectations (e.g., the action/outcome could 
not and should not have been any different) and limit the search for disconfirming information 
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(Holtz & Harold, 2008; Holtz, 2013; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999). In such cases, the agent 
bias will manifest as a positive effect of agent characteristics on event justice (see Figure 3).  
Research on person perception and interpersonal communication has clearly shown that 
relatively stable person perceptions are based on day to day experiences with a person, and then 
used to interpret and anticipate the person’s behavior. When first meeting, individuals exchange 
socio-demographic information, beliefs, and attitudes (Berger & Calabrese, 1975) in order to 
gauge the extent to which others are stereotypical, prototypical, or similar to self, in order to 
reduce uncertainty regarding the other’s expected behaviors (e.g., Berndt & Heller, 1986; Hogg, 
2000; Chattopadhyay, George, & Lawrence, 2004). Van den Bos, Burrows, Umphress, Folger, 
Lavelle, Eaglestone and Gee (2005) showed that neutral messages coming from an authority 
figure that was unfair in the past were viewed more negatively than the same messages from an 
authority figure that was fair in the past. People also judge events as less fair when they hear 
from peers that the agent had been unfair versus fair in the past (Jones & Skarlicki, 2005).  
Hence, under high event ambiguity, agent warmth, competence, and entity justice will 
positively affect event justice perceptions.  
Proposition 3: When the actions/outcomes of an event are ambiguous, agent warmth, 
competence and/or entity justice will relate positively to overall event justice. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 Low event ambiguity. On the other hand, some events are clearly just or unjust. We 
propose that in such cases, the agent bias can manifest as either a positive or a negative effect 
of agent characteristics on overall event justice, depending on match or mismatch between agent 
characteristics and actions/outcomes of the event, termed event expectedness (see Figure 4). 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Expected events. When just events result from behavior by agents whose characteristics 
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foster trust, the events are expected, as fair treatment has been customarily associated with high 
trust (Colquitt et al., 2001; Stinglhamber, Cremer, & Mercken, 2006). When unjust events result 
from behavior by agents whose characteristics do not foster trust, the events are also expected. 
Jones and Skarlicki (2013, p.5) describe how when a justice event is expected because of entity 
justice, it will be biased in the direction of the agent’s known characteristic:  
Because entity perceptions are derived from the accumulation of experiences over time, justice events will 
often reflect what individuals expect from the entity. As such, many justice events will “fly under the 
cognitive radar”, so to speak, and individuals will process them in a relatively automatic fashion – when 
this occurs, researchers suggest, justice judgments are particularly prone to the influence of cognitive biases 
(Tangirala & Alge, 2006). We propose that when justice events are expected, individuals tend to judge them 
with a confirmatory bias, that is, with a bias toward judging the event in the direction of their initial entity 
perception.  
In both instances, the relationship between agent characteristics (warmth, competence, 
entity justice) and overall event justice will be positive. Hence,  
Proposition 4: When the actions/outcomes of an event are unambiguous and expected, 
agent warmth, competence and/or entity justice will relate positively to overall event justice. 
Unexpected events. The effect of agent warmth, competence and entity justice on 
overall event justice is expected to be different when events are unexpected. First, an agent who 
is expected to be fair (because of their warmth, competence, and/or entity justice) might 
nonetheless be associated with an action or outcome that is clearly unfair. Similarly, an agent 
from whom unfair treatment would be expected (because of their lack of warmth, competence, 
and/or entity justice) might be associated with an action or outcome that is clearly fair. We 
explain below, using entity justice as an example, the possibility of negative relationships 
between agent characteristics and event justice.  
When an agent who is high in entity justice clearly violates fairness criteria, upward 
counterfactuals for the event can easily be generated. Given high entity justice of the agent, 
16 
 
counterfactual scenarios are likely to compare favorably to experienced actions and outcome. 
As comparisons to outcomes that would have been better produce negative feelings (Roese, 
1997; Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995), event justice perceptions are likely to be negatively 
affected by entity justice perceptions. This negative effect of agent characteristics on event 
justice perceptions has been documented by Nicklin and colleagues (2011), who found that high 
versus low perceptions of agent competence related to lower event justice perceptions when the 
agent made a mistake. 
A similar negative effect on overall event justice is expected for agents whose 
characteristics are associated with unfair treatment and who unexpectedly act in ways that 
uphold justice criteria. Such agents may be credited for upholding justice criteria more than 
others because downward counterfactuals are generated with greater ease, resulting in more 
positive event justice perceptions.  
Proposition 5: When the actions/outcomes of an event are unambiguous and unexpected, 
agent’s warmth, competence, and/or entity justice will relate negatively to overall event 
justice. 
Magnitude of the Bias: The Role of Information Processing Style 
We have proposed that the agent bias can operate through the effect on overall justice 
of agent warmth, competence, or entity justice. We argue here that the magnitude of the agent 
bias on overall justice of events will depend on how information regarding the event is 
processed by the justice recipient. 
Information processing of justice-relevant events can be more analytic, deliberate and 
controlled versus more heuristic and automatic (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2014). Fairness 
heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) distinguishes between two cognitive processes used in judging 
event justice: a more analytic and effortful evaluation of overall justice at the start of a 
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relationship or during times of change (judgmental phase), and a more intuitive and heuristic 
process when a past evaluation is in place and relied upon (use phase). The judgmental phase 
is typically brief, yet we suggest individuals may still approach it in either a more heuristic or 
a more analytic way.  In the use phase, individuals anchor on previously formed judgments of 
overall justice in evaluating and deciding how to respond to subsequent events, making the 
output of the judgmental phase of great relevance. 
Because relying on first impressions or on entity justice can save time and cognitive 
effort, agent bias is expected to be stronger under heuristic processing of information. This is 
consistent with research showing that the source of communication (versus the content) has 
greater influence on attitudes and reactions when information processing is more heuristic 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Similarly, studies of decision making by juries show that when 
jurors are motivated to think analytically versus heuristically they are less biased by personal 
characteristics (i.e., physical attractiveness) of the defendant (Lieberman, 2002). Therefore, 
we propose that when justice recipients engage in analytic versus heuristic processing of 
events, they are more likely to focus on distributive, procedural, interactional, or other action 
or outcome-based justice criteria, thereby reducing agent bias. 
Proposition 6: Agent bias will be weaker when recipients judge events using analytic 
information processing than when recipients judge events using heuristic information 
processing. 
Relevant experience with the justice agent may interact with the information processing 
style used by the justice recipient to affect the magnitude of the agent bias. Under heuristic 
processing, if there is previous fairness-related experience with the agent employees will 
strongly anchor on entity justice, but if there is no previous fairness related experience with the 
agent employees will anchor strongly on agent warmth and/or competence. However, analytic 
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processing is expected to more strongly reduce the effect on overall justice of warmth and 
competence than of agent entity justice (see Figure 5). Entity justice judgments are expected to 
continue to influence overall event justice, even when information is processed analytically, 
because they share similar purpose and structure with event justice judgments (Mussweiler & 
Strack, 2001). In contrast, perceptions regarding agent warmth and competence are not 
expected to as strongly influence overall event justice when analytic processing is used because 
they are more distal predictors of justice-related actions and outcomes. 
Proposition 7: Agent bias will be weaker when recipients judge events using analytic 
information processing, with the effect of entity justice decreasing less than the effect of 
warmth and competence. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
Discussion 
Summary 
In this article, we explore how and when agent characteristics will influence perceptions 
of overall justice regarding events. We use the term “agent bias” to denote the effect of agent 
characteristics that is not mediated by justice perceptions regarding dimensional justice or other 
action and outcome-based criteria. In the absence of justice-relevant experience with the agent, 
recipients are expected to anchor their judgments of event justice on the warmth and/or 
competence of the agent. If the recipient has a previously formed entity justice perception 
regarding the agent, entity justice (and to a smaller extent, warmth and competence) is expected 
to influence evaluations of event justice.  
We also propose effects on the agent bias of event ambiguity, defined as a lack of clarity 
regarding the fairness of an event. The more ambiguous the event, the more that justice 
judgments are likely to positively relate to characteristics of the agent. When events are low on 
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ambiguity (i.e., clearly fair or unfair), the effect of agent characteristics on overall event justice 
will depend on the expectedness of the event given the agent’s characteristics. When agent 
characteristics lead to an event being expected, these characteristics will positively relate to 
overall event justice. On the other hand, when actions or outcomes are unexpected given the 
agent’s characteristics, these characteristics will negatively relate to overall event justice. In 
addition, the agent bias should decrease when individuals shift from heuristic to analytic 
processing and more strongly when there is no prior justice history between the agent and the 
recipient.  
Contributions to the Literature 
Our approach builds on and extends existing literatures on justice, trust, social cognition 
and judgment and decision making in several ways. 
Justice. Justice theories have tended to assume that the building blocks of justice 
judgments are evaluations regarding actions and outcomes, which in turn influence entity 
justice judgments (e.g., Rupp & Paddock, 2010). We propose that not only do event perceptions 
influence judgments regarding agents, but that judgments regarding agents also influence event 
perceptions. In proposing that characteristics of the justice agent can affect counterfactual 
thinking about justice, our work builds on fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). We 
propose that generation of counterfactuals is more likely when an event is low in ambiguity and 
unexpected given the agent’s characteristics. In such cases, individuals judge events based on 
how easily would, could and should counterfactuals are generated for this particular agent. On 
the other hand, when an event is high in ambiguity characteristics of the agent are more likely 
used to make sense of the justice event. By including in our model both high and low ambiguity 
events, we extend the work on contextual variables affecting justice judgments by Nicklin and 
colleagues (2011).  
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Our model also extends fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) by proposing that the 
initial information that people anchor on in forming justice judgments can include 
characteristics of the agent, rather than just information regarding other justice dimensions. 
Further, we provide rationale for why agent characteristics may help explain unexplained 
variance in event evaluations after controlling for distributive, procedural and interactional 
justice (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009; Holtz & Harold, 2009). 
Trust. As in the trust primacy model (Holtz 2013; 2015), the agent bias relates agent 
characteristics to perceptions of event justice. However, our reasoning on agent bias draws on 
the social cognition literature in examining agent characteristics, such as warmth and 
competence, in addition to entity justice. This approach connects our work to a broader 
literature on person perception, while still leveraging important insights from research on 
justice and agent trustworthiness because the integrity, benevolence, and competence 
dimensions of trustworthiness overlap with the characteristics we chose to consider. Whereas 
the trust primacy model considered effects of uncertainty regarding the trustworthiness of an 
agent, we proposed that ambiguity at the level of the event can affect whether the agent bias 
has a positive or a negative effect on overall event justice. Future research combining insights 
from trust primacy and agent bias might explore the effects of all agent ambiguity and event 
ambiguity combinations: low-low, low-high, high-low, and high-high. Additionally, future 
research may explore what comes into play when agent ambiguity is high. In particular, there 
may be individual differences in trust propensity (Mayer et al., 1995) that might predispose 
some employees more to the agent bias (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006).  
Social cognition. Work on agent bias can both contribute to and be further enriched by 
research in other domains that examine why the same behavior can be evaluated and reacted to 
differently, depending on agent characteristics. Research on the evaluation of gender 
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stereotypic (hence, expected) and gender non-stereotypic (hence, unexpected) behavior in 
managerial settings supports our propositions regarding events that are expected versus 
unexpected, depending on agent characteristics. For example, women are penalized in terms of 
overall work performance ratings for not performing positive stereotypic behavior such as 
helping, whereas men are not (Heilman & Chen, 2005). On the other hand, men benefit in terms 
of work performance ratings from helping, but women do not. In the case of women, it may be 
easier for upward counterfactuals to be generated, whereas in the case of men it may be easier 
for downward counterfactuals to be generated.  
Judgment and decision making. The agent bias, as other biases (e.g., Ito et al., 2015), 
will be less strong when information processing is analytic versus heuristic. However, different 
manifestations of the agent bias may react differently to a shift from heuristic to analytic 
processing style. For instance, we propose that the effect of entity justice may decrease less 
than the effect of warmth or competence under analytic processing. This shows how important 
it is to have a model of the bias to better understand when and how it can diminish. 
The work context of our model also offers novel testing grounds for some of the 
known decision making biases. Dual-process research has established that people tend to rely 
more on heuristic processing under time pressure (Kahneman, 2011), cognitive overload or 
exhaustion (Bodenhausen, 1990), stress (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009), fear (Pfister & Bohm, 
2008), and perceived uncertainty (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002). These variables are likely to 
also influence the processing of justice events in the workplace, especially given the 
prevalence of time pressure, cognitive overload, and stress in many work environments. 
Employee feelings of fear and uncertainty may also become more prominent as major change 
becomes a prevalent feature of contemporary organizational life (Burnes, 2005). Exploring 
what happens as a result of such forces to different manifestations of the agent bias merits 
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further research attention, and may enrich our understanding of judgment and decision 
making more broadly.  
Directions for Future Research 
Level of analysis. Although our focus has been on the effect of agent characteristics on 
overall event justice, dimensional justice judgments may also be biased by agent characteristics. 
Future research should examine for which justice dimension(s) this is most likely to be the case. 
Agent characteristics may be a particularly important influence on justice dimensions 
associated with higher versus lower agent discretion, as in the case of interpersonal justice 
(Scott, Colquitt & Paddock, 2009). To the extent that dimensional justice of an event is 
perceptual, it may be affected by the agent bias just as overall event justice perceptions. For 
example, for timeliness as a criterion of informational justice (Colquitt, 2001), subjective 
judgments may conflict with objective timeliness and still matter more to attitudinal and 
behavioral reactions (Conlon & Murray, 1996; Groth & Gilliland, 2001). Future research should 
investigate how the different pathways for the effect on overall event justice of agent 
characteristics – via direct effects, via dimensional justice, or by moderating the relationship 
between dimensional and overall event justice – compare in terms of form and magnitude 
(Marques, Patient, & Cojuharenco, 2017).  
Temporal dynamics. In our theorizing on agent bias we do not examine how actions 
and outcomes that uphold standards of justice feed back into perceptions about the agent. How 
entity justice judgments or dimensions of trustworthiness evolve over time is at the center of 
other theoretical (e.g., Holtz, 2013) and empirical work (e.g., Lance Frazier, Johnson, Gavin, 
Gooty, & Bradley Snow, 2010). With respect to entity justice, we agree with Jones and Skarlicki 
(2013) that individuals who experience fair events from agents believed to be unfair are likely 
to remain suspicious and refrain from updating beliefs about the agent based on only one 
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(unexpected) fair event. We suggest, however, that justice judgments concerning unexpectedly 
unfair events will be amplified because of counterfactual thinking, and so will judgments 
concerning events that are unexpectedly fair.  
Work on the “persistent injustice effect” (Davidson & Friedman, 1998) suggests that 
actions aimed at repairing perceptions of unfair treatment may not work for individuals who 
have experienced unfair treatment for too long. This persistent injustice effect, due to 
entrenched mistrust and strong expectations for injustice, may present an important boundary 
condition for the agent bias. For example, if an agent’s dismal justice track record has led to a 
persistent injustice effect, the agent bias will always be strong and in a direction consistent with 
the agent characteristics, regardless of the ease with which downward counterfactuals can be 
generated. Future research should examine the effect on the agent bias of a person’s readiness 
to revise his or her assessment of agent characteristics.  
Other agent characteristics. In this work, we developed research propositions about 
the effects of warmth and competence on overall event justice judgments. Recent research in 
social cognition suggests that a third dimension, morality, is distinct from other warmth 
characteristics, can be more important for first impressions, and combines with warmth and 
competence to substantially explain variance in first impressions about people (Goodwin, 
2015). Such a three-dimensional framework would align well with the dimensions of 
trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995). Our propositions currently formulated for warmth should 
also be valid for morality, even if it is understood as an agent characteristic that is separate from 
other warmth-related components of first impressions.  
In fact, agent morality has received direct attention in person-centered approaches to 
moral judgment, which are also relevant to the agent bias. These approaches focus on personal 
qualities rather than on acts when judging what is right (Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). 
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In contrast, most approaches to moral psychology have focused on acts, either through 
consequentialist theories that judge acts to be right or wrong based on their consequences (e.g., 
Smart & Williams, 1973), or deontological theories that judge acts by universal rules of ethical 
behavior (e.g., Kant, 1796/2002). As with agent bias, accounting for agent morality helps 
explain why events may be judged as unethical even if specific actions and outcomes are not.  
Conclusion 
This article brings together insights from several literatures in order to propose how 
justice perceptions about events can be affected by characteristics of the justice agent, with a 
focus on warmth, competence, and entity justice. We propose a model for when and how an 
agent bias is more likely to influence justice judgments and offer testable propositions. Insights 
regarding the importance of selecting appropriate agents should interest managers and 
organizations tasked with making and communicating tough decisions, which is when justice 
perceptions become most salient and important. We hope that scholars interested in justice, 
trust, social cognition, and judgment and decision making will find our model interesting and 
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1 The agent bias model is depicted by solid lines. Dashed lines represent effects that are possible but go 
beyond the scope of the model. 
Previous experience between justice agent and recipient (P1-P2 on form) 
Justice ambiguity and expectedness (P3-P5 on direction)
Information processing style (P6-P7 on magnitude)

















2 High and low refer to levels relative to the sample mean. High levels refer to 1 standard deviation above 
mean; low levels refer to 1 standard deviation below mean. 
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Figure 5: Form and magnitude3 of agent bias as a function of relevant experience and 




3 Magnitude of the bias is depicted as font size: the bigger the font size, the greater the effect. 
